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A CONTEXT FOR PARIS-HARRINGTON COMBINATORIAL PRINCIPLE
JOEL TORRES DEL VALLE
For a long time there was the pretence of conceiving mathematics as an idealization of the
palpable world, and proceeding on it as one would between objects of the real world. At
the end of the 19th century paradoxes began to appear in the young Set Theory of Georg
Cantor and thus mathematics, which bore the unworthy title of an exact science, began
to fade away. It was observed, then, that the beautiful building stood on quicksand and
staggered to the sound of the lightest wind.
Then began a program of foundation of mathematics, which was intended to build solid
foundations on which to stop the mathematical building. Of the various currents of mathe-
matical philosophy that addressed the problem, we can point to Hilbert’s Formalism. The
formalist programwas mainly driven by David Hilbert, and his final requirement was proof
of the non-contradiction of mathematics. Of course, we take for granted, the dream of the
completeness of the formal systems upon which mathematics would be based. For David
Hilbert, logic and mathematics are theories of form and not of meaning, [2]. That is to
say, all the tests were to be carried out by means of fixed rules on the handling of symbols,
without taking into account at any time the meaning of the symbols. Thought that is clear
when this says: mathematics is a game with very simple rules, which leave meaningless
marks on paper.
The zeal for a proof of non-contradiction comes after the works of Gottlob Frege (1848-
1925) [3] could be deduced Russell’s paradox, which in Peano’s symbolism could be ex-
pressed as1 w = cls∩ x  (x ∼ εx). ⊃: w ∈ w. = .w ∼ εw, which, in Russell’s own words,
corresponds to: let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself.
Can w be a predicated of itself? From each answer its opposite follows. Therefore we must
conclude that w is not a predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes
which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves.
And I cannot let pass, of course, the height with which Frege assumes the terrifying
news that his work allowed the appearance of paradoxes and, full of scientific humility, he
adds a note to the second volume of his work [4] which was already in print, in which he
comments on Russell’s discovery in the first volume of his work.
In the year 1910 appears the first volume of Principia Mathematica, in which Bertrand
Russell (1972-1970) and Alfred NorthWhitehead (1861-1947), build much of mathematics
without paradoxes or apparent contradictions. The question then remained as to whether
the system was complete, given that everything seemed to indicate consistency. The first
steps towards a clarification of this requirement were taken in a direction that seemed to
discern an light at the end of the tunnel. Firstly in 1930, in his doctoral thesis [5] Kurt
Go¨del (1906-1978) proved the completeness of First-Order Logical Calculus. However,
by these paradoxes of luck, it is the same Go¨del who a year later, in 1931 proved that if
we add to Peano’s Axioms for arithmetic all the logic of Principia Mathematica, we do not
obtain a system from which all the truths about natural numbers can be demonstrated, [6].
1Take from Bertrand Russell - Gottlob Frege correspondence.
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Specifically (see Some mathematical results on completeness and consistency, Kurt Go¨del,
1931)
1. The S system is not complete, that is, in it there are sentences ϕ , such that neither
ϕ nor ¬¬ϕ are probable and, in particular, there are undecidable problems with
the simple structure ∃xFx, where x varies over natural numbers and F is a property
of natural numbers.
2. Even if we admit all the logical means of Principia Mathematica in metamathe-
matics there is no proof of consistency for S. Therefore, a consistency test for the
S system can only be carried out with the help of inference modes that are not
formalized in the S system.
3. Not even adding to S a finite amount of axioms in such a way that the extended
system remains ω-consistent.
However, these phrases initially were not something that a mathematician would ask
himself, for example, a mathematician would ask himself is Goldbach’s conjecture true or
false? etc. However, through a process today known as Go¨del Coding, Go¨del constructs
an explicit phrase, from the Theory of Numbers (but which does not arise naturally in it)
that cannot be proved or refuted. Something like a mathematical formulation of the liar
paradox2. So the question remains, how can we make these phrases more mathematical?
There appeared Paris-Harrington result.
In previous years had already established such results in Euclidean Geometry (in the
19th century) and Set Theory, namely the V Postulate of Euclid by Ja´nos Bolyai and
Nikola´i Lobachesky and the Continuum Hypothesis, by Kurt Go¨del and Paul Cohen. On
the V Postulate of Euclides, it was proved that it is independent of the Euclid’s axiomatic
system, and that in the same way geometries can be constructed where it is valid and where
it is not, which gives the appearance to non-Euclidean Geometries. The same thing hap-
pened with the continuum of Cantor.
In this pages we present a context for Paris-Harrington Principle. We follow [11] for
Section 3, [9] for Section 4; for Section 1 we follow [15]. For some background in Combi-
natorial Set Theory we use [10], [15]. It is important to make clear, that in the formulation
of PH which we study, we just consider partitions of sets like m := {0,1, ...,m− 1}. A
general formulation can be done following the same argument that we present here for
H ∈ Par([m]n,c).
1. THE PARIS HARRINGTON PRINCIPLE
1.1. The Ko¨nig’s Lemma.
We start with some background in Combinatorial Set Theory. For the proof of Infinite
Ramsey Theorem (and so for that of PH) we need the Ko¨nig’s Lemma which we prove
here. For this section we follow [15, 10, 11].
Definition 1.1. A tree is a partially ordered set (T,<T ) such that for all t ∈ T , the set
t̂ := {s ∈ T : s <T t} is well ordered. A branch of a tree T is a co-final chain (a linearly
ordered set) maximal of T . A trajectory of T is a chain of T which is also a initial segment
of T .
2Go¨del demonstrates that natural numbers are strong enough to codify all the truths of the S system and about
the S.
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In Figure 1. it is drawn a tree, in Figure 2. a trajectory and in Figure 3. a branch of a tree.
Definition 1.2. A finite branching tree is a partially ordered set (T,<T ) such that: there
exists r ∈ T such that r<T x for all x∈ T . If x∈ T , then {y : y<T x} is finite and linearly or-
dered by<T and finally if x∈ T , each finite set (maybe empty) {y1, ...,yn} of incomparable
elements such that each yi > x and each z> x, then z> yi for some i.
It is known that any well ordered set is isomorphic to some unique ordinal. This ordinal
is known as type ordinal of the set. The height hgt(t) of t in T is the ordinal type of t̂. The
level α of T is the set Tα := {t ∈ T : hgt(t) = α}. The height of T is min{α : Tα = /0}.
Definition 1.3. Let be θ an ordinal and λ a cardinal. A tree T is a (θ ,λ )-tree if: (∀α <
θ )(Tα 6= /0), Tθ = /0 and (∀α < θ )(card(Tα)< λ ). An ℵ0-tree, is simple a (ℵ0,ℵ0)-tree.
Lemma 1.4 (Ko¨ning’s Lemma). Any ℵ0-tree has a branch which intersects any levels.
In fact, let T be an ℵ0-tree. By induction on n < ω , let us choice tn ∈ Tn such that T
tn
is infinite and tn <T tn+1. Then, {tn : n< ω} is a co-final branch of T .
1.2. Partitions theorems.
The next step is to prove Infinite and Finite Ramsey theorems for partitions.
Definition 1.5. Let σ be a cardinal, [I]k the set of those subset of I of size k. A map
P : [I]k → σ is called a partition of [I]k in σ pieces. A set Y ⊂ I is called homogeneous
for the partition P, if P is constant on [H]k.
We note κ → (λ )nσ to indicate that: whenever P : [κ ]
n → σ is a partition of [κ ]n into σ
pieces, then there exists Y ⊂ κ of size at most λ homogeneous for P. If it also card(Y ) ≥
min(Y ) we call Y relatively large, and we note κ
∗
// (λ )nσ .
Theorem 1.6 (Infinite Ramsey Theorem). For any natural numbers n,k it holds that ℵ0→
(ℵ0)
n
k .
We proceed by induction on n. For n= 0 there it nothing to prove because f is constant
on [A]0 = { /0}. Let n> 0.
We define a decreasing sequence recursively A0 ⊃ A1 ⊃ ... of infinite sets of A and a
sequence a0,a1, ... of elements of A with ai ∈ A j only if i≥ j.
We start with A0 = A. Let us suppose that Ai is given. Let it be ai ∈ Ai arbitrary. We
define fi : [Ai \{ai}]
n−1→m by fi(b) = f ({ai}∪b). As Ai+1, we choose fi-homogeneous
of Ai \ {ai}.
Let it be mi the value that takes fi in [Ai+1]
n−1. Then, for each k < m the set B = {ai :
mi = k} is f -homogeneous: each set of n elements c of B is of the form {ai}∪b for some
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b ∈ [Ai+1]
n−1. We have f (c) = fi(b) = k. Then there exists k < m such that mi = k for a
infinite quantity of i ∈ ω . B is infinite for this k. This completes the proof.
Application 1.7 (Cited from [11]). Any sequence {ri}i∈N of real numbers has a monotonic
subsequence. In fact, let be f : [N]2 → 3 defined by
f ({i, j}) :=

0 i< j and ri < r j
1 i< j and ri = r j
2 i< j and ri > r j
By the Infinite Ramsey Theorem, there is Y ⊂N with card(Y ) = ℵ0 such that f is constant
on [Y ]2. Let j0 < j1 < ... list Y . There is c ∈ 3 := {0,1,2} such that f ({im, jn}) = c for
m< n. If c= 0, the sequence {r jk}k∈Y is increasing, if c= 1 it is constant, and c= 2 it is
decreasing.
Theorem 1.8 (Finite Ramsey Theorem). For any natural numbers n,r,k there exists a
natural number l such that l→ (r)nk .
In fact, suppose there is not such l. For each l < ω , let be Tl the set defined by: Tl :=
{ f : [l]n → k : there not exists a set of l of size r homogeneous for f }.
Clearly, Tl is finite, since there are finite partitions of finite sets. Let be f ∈ Tl+1, then
there is an unique g ∈ Tl such that g ⊂ f . Hence, if we order the set T =
⋃
l<ω Tl by
inclusion, we obtain a finite tree. Each Tj 6= /0. Then, we obtain a tree of finite branching.
By Ko¨ning’s Lemma, we can find f0 ⊂ f1 ⊂ ... with each fi ∈ Ti. Let be f =
⋃
fi, then
f : [N]n → k. For Infinite Ramsey Theorem, there is a X ⊂ N infinite homogeneous for f .
Let be x1, ...,xr, the first r elements of X and let be s> xr, then {x1, ...,xr} is homogeneous
for fs. This is a contradiction.
Application 1.9. 6→ (3)22. That is, for any partition f : [6]
2 → 2 there exists a subset of
6 with size 3 such that f : [3]2 → 2 is constant. As a consequence of this, we have that in
a meeting of six people, three o them know each other, or three of them don’t know each
other. For this, consider the set p= {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6} of people and f the function
f : [p]2 −→ 2
{pi, p j} 7−→
{
1 if pi knows p j
0 if pi doesn
′t know p j
By Finite Ramsey theorem, there exists p′ ⊂ p with card(p′) = 3 such that f : [p′]2 → 2 is
constant. Then f ([p′]2) = 0 or f ([p′]2) = 1. So, we obtain the result.
Theorem 1.10 (Paris-Harrington Principle). For any natural numbers n,r,k there exists a
natural number m such that m
∗
// (k)nr .
Paris-Harrington result was the first mathematical independence in arithmetic result
since Go¨del’s Theorems. And it was the answer to the question: How can we make in-
dependence results mathematical? Because of Go¨del presented an explicit sentence which
is independent of PA, but these didn’t appear naturally from the number theory, nor it was
a metamathematical statement which asserted it’s own independence; it was important to
answer the question above.
Proof. Let be n,r and k natural numbers. Suppose that there not exists such m. Let P be a
counterexample form. If P is a partition of [m]n in r parts with any homogeneous subset of
size at most k. We can see the set of counterexamples as a infinite tree of finite branching,
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that is to say, if P and P′ are counterexamples for m and m′ respectively, we put P below
P′ in our tree only if m< m′ and P is a restriction of P′ to [m]n.
By Ko¨nig’s Lemma there is a P : [ω ]n → r such that for any m, the restriction of P to
[m]n is a counterexample form. By Infinite Ramsey Theorem, there exists a H ⊂ω infinite
homogeneous for P. But then, by taking m enough large (comparing with k and minH) we
see that H ∩m is, after all, an homogeneous set relatively large for P ↾ [m]n of size at least
k. 
Finite Ramsey Theorem is an assertion about integers, so we would prefer to give a
proof for it without using infinite methods as we do here. Our approach is given like in
[11, 15], but in other works a finite approach is given. On the other hand since PH looks
like Finite Ramsey Theorem we would expect the same occurs with it, but this is not the
case: we can’t carry out PH proof without inifinite methods, so we can’t neither formalize
the proof of PH in the language of arithmetic as we can do with that of Finite Ramsey
Theorem.
By using the argument of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, on 70’s years, Jeff Paris
and Leo Harrington, showed that an strength of Finite Ramsey Theorem is not provable
from Peano Arithmetic, PA. In [12] Paris and Harrington introduce a certain theory T , and
they show that Con(T )→ Con(PA) is theorem of PA, then the proof of the independence
of PH is complete when they show that PH→ Con(T ) is also a theorem of PA, since for
the Second Incompleteness Theorem it would impossible that PA ⊢ PH.
2. ENCODING FINITE SUBSETS AND PARTITIONS
In 1931, Kurt Go¨del, introduced a process which nowadays is known as Go¨del number-
ing, and it permitted him to translate into the language LA := {0,1,+, ·,<} of Arithmetic
some interesting and important metamathematical properties on Number Theory, such as
Consistency, etc. By using this, Go¨del proved his celebrated Incompleteness Theorems;
these ones, represented the end of the Formalist Dream. Go¨del numbering also permits us
to express any properties of Finite Combinatorics and Partitions, into the language LA.
2.1. Go¨del codes for finite sets.
For this section I mainly follow [9]. Identify each natural number with their set of
predecessors, i.e.,m := {0,1, ...,m−1}. We will work with sets written in increasing order.
The Go¨del code for the set a = {a0,a1, ...,an} is defined by := 2
a03a1 · · · pann = ∏
n
i=0 p
ai
i .
Here, pn represents the n-prime number. For the uniqueness of prime factorization, the
Go¨del code of a set a is a unique number. It is clear that the number of prime factors in the
code of a is the same number of elements in a.
Definition 2.1. Let us write Prime(p) to mean ‘p is a prime number’. This is given the
formula:
Prime(p) := p 6= 0∧ p 6= 1∧∀x< p![x|p→ p= x∨ x= 1],x|p := ∃z[xz= p].
Definition 2.2. Let g(x,y) be a function, we define the µ-bounded operator by: f (x,x) =
µy < x[g(x,y) = 0] to be: the least y < x such that g(x,y) = 0 if there exists such y, and
0 otherwise. ‘pn is the n-th prime number’ is defined by pn := p0 = 2, pn+1 := µx <
pn!+ 1[pn < x∧Prime(x)].
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Definition 2.3. We define ‘Seq’ to be the set of those numbers which codifies sequences
as it follows:
a ∈ Seq↔ a= 1∨ (a> 1∧∀x≤ a[px+1|a→ px|a]).
Let be a ∈Seq, we define ‘Lgh(a)’ to be the length of the sequence codified by a by the
formula:
Lgh(a) :=
{
0 if a 6∈ Seq∨a= 1
µx≤ a[px|a∧¬(px+1|a)] if a ∈ Seq∧a 6= 1.
‘(a)x’ means that ‘x is the x-th component of the sequence codified by a’ and it is defined
as:
(a)x := µy≤ x+ 1[p
y+1
x |a∧¬(p
y+2
x |a)].
Remark 2.4. Let be a ∈Seq then we can write a = ∏i≤Lgh(a) p
(a)i+1
i . So, we define con-
catenation of sequences a and b by
a ∗ b= a ∏
x≤Lgh(b)
p
(b)x+1
Lgh(a)+x+1
, ifa,b 6= 1.
Go¨del introduced a pairing function<,> which assigns to each (x,y) ∈N×N a unique
single natural number. This will be useful later for encoding partitions of finite subsets of
natural numbers. Go¨del pairing function is given by
<,>: N×N −→ N
(x,y) 7−→ (x+y)(x+y+1)
2
+ y.
Lemma 2.5. For any four given natural numbers x,y,u,v the following is true< x,y>=<
u,v> iff x= y and u= v.
Letm,n,c∈Nwith n≤m. We write ‘H ∈ Part([m]n,c)’ to mean ‘H is a partition of [m]n
into c pieces’. There exists a formula which it associates to H an unique natural number
⌈H⌉. In fact:
⌈H⌉ := ∏
1≤r≤n
0≤α≤c−1
p
 ∏1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα + 1

 ∏1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα

2 +cα
r .
We can write a subset of [m]n as {m− i0, ...,m− in−1} been 1 ≤ i j ≤ m for 0 ≤ j ≤
n−1. Now, card([m]n) =
(
m
n
)
= m!
n!(m−n)!
. Then we can list the elements of [m]n as: [m]n =
m1, ...,m(mn)
. Let be H ∈ Part([m]n,c). We can write H as
H :=
{
(mδ ,cα ) : 1≤ δ ≤
(
m
n
)
∧0≤ α ≤ c
}
. Let mδ ∈ [m]
n, for 1≤ δ ≤
(
m
n
)
. Then
⌈mδ ⌉ = ⌈{m− i0, ...,m− in−1}⌉
= ∏
1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
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for certain 1≤ i0, ..., in−1 ≤ m. So, for each pair (mδ ,cα) we have a unique corresponding
pair  ∏
1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
,cα

Then
⌈mδ ,cα⌉ = 〈⌈mδ ⌉,cα〉
= 〈⌈{m− i0, ...,m− in−1}⌉,cα〉
=
〈
∏
1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
,cα
〉
=
 ∏
1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα + 1

 ∏
1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα

2
+ cα
Finally
⌈H⌉ := ∏
1≤r≤n
0≤α≤c−1
p
 ∏1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα + 1

 ∏1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα

2 +cα
r .
*PH as a sentence on sequences.
PH. For any natural numbers b,e,y codifying sequences of length n,c and at least λ , re-
spectively, there exists a natural number a codifying a sequence of length m such that, for
any H ∈ Part([m]n,c), there exits a unique natural number β ≤ Lgh(e) such that for any
1≤ k1≤
(
m
n
)
, (mk1 ,cβ )∈H and there doesn’t exists α ∈N such that for some 0≤ k2≤
(
m
n
)
,
(mk2 ,cα) ∈H whenever b is such that there is a sequence s codifying a sequence such that
y= b ∗ s and it holds that Lgh(y)≥ (y)0. In symbols:
∀b ∈ Seq∀e ∈ Seq∀y ∈ Seq∃a ∈ Seq[[Lgh(b) = n∧Lgh(a) = m∧Lgh(e) = c∧Lgh(y) ≤
λ ∧ n ≤ m] : (∀H ∈ Part([m]n,c))[(s∃ ∈ Seq)[y = b ∗ s]→ (∃!β ≤ Lgh(e) ∈ N))[(∀k1 ≤(
m
n
)
∈ N)[(mk1 ,cβ ) ∈ H]∧ (¬∃α ≤ Lgh(e) ∈ N)[(∃k2 ≤
(
m
n
)
∈ N)[(mk2 ,cα) ∈ H]]]]∧
Lgh(y)≥ (y)0].
This is now a formulation in LA for PH. We can see is term used here has an explicit
formulation in arithmetic. So, it we want to have pure symbolic formulation with symbols
of LA we would have to take the meaning of Seq, Lgh, etc. and put it into the formula
above. The formula we obtain after doing this is the following. You must note it can be
even longer!
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[(∀b(b= 1∨ (b> 1∧∀x1 ≤ b[px1+1|b→ px1 |b])))(∀e(e= 1∨ (e> 1∧∀x2 ≤ e[px2+1|e→
px2 |e])))(∀y(y= 1∨(y> 1∧∀x3≤ y[px3+1|y→ px3 |y])))(∃a(a= 1∨(a> 1∧∀x4≤ a[px4+1|a→
px4 |a])))]{ [
µx5 ≤ b[px5 |b∧¬(px5+1|b)]) = n∧
µx6 ≤ a[px5 |a∧¬(px5+1|a)]) = m∧µx7 ≤ e[px5 |e∧¬(px5+1|e)]) = c∧
µx8 ≤ y[px5 |y∧¬(px5+1|y)])≤ λ ∧n≤ m] :
∀H = ∏
0≤r≤n−1
0≤α≤c−1
p
 ∏1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα + 1

 ∏1≤i j≤m
0≤ j≤n−1
p
m−i j
i j
+ cα

2 +cα
r

(∃s(s= 1∨ (s> 1∧∀x6 ≤ s[px6+1|s→ px6 |s]))y= b ∏
x7≤µx8≤s[px8 |s∧¬(px8+1|s)]
p
µx9≤x7+1[p
x9+1
x7
|s∧¬(p
x9+1
x7
|s)]+1
µx5≤y[px5 |y∧¬(px5+1|y)]+x7+1
→
(∃!β = 1+ · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
β−times
≤ µx7 ≤ e[px7 |e∧¬(px7+1|e)]))∀k1 = 1+ · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k1−times
≤ m(m−1)(m−2)···(m−(m−1))
n(n−1)···(n−(n−1))(m−n)(m−n−1)···((m−n−(m−n−1))) = h

∃η = 1+ · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
η−times
≤ h
[
p
⌈⌈mk1 ⌉,cβ ⌉
η |H
]
∧
(¬∃α = 1+ · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
a−times
≤ µx7 ≤ e[px5 |e∧¬(px5+1|e)]))∃k2 = 1+ · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k2−times
≤ m(m−1)(m−2)···(m−(m−1))
n(n−1)···(n−(n−1))(m−n)(m−n−1)···((m−n−(m−n−1)))

∃ρ = 1+ · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ−times
≤ h
(
p
⌈⌈mk2 ⌉,cα ⌉
ρ |H
)]]]
∧
µx8 ≤ y[px5 |y∧¬(px5+1|y)])≥ µx10 ≤ 0+ 1[p
0+1
x10
|y∧¬(p0+2x10 |y)]
}
For getting this formulation, we wrote ⌈⌈mk2⌉,cα⌉ to mean the code of the pair (mk2 ,cα).
We also used the notation pn to mean pn is the n-th prime number. We also omitted replace
the meaning of the µ-bounded operator. But, note that with doing this we don’t lose the
sense of the formula, but we agree that it is easier to read.
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